Distributed Denial-of-Service (DDoS) attacks have emerged as a popular means of causing mass targeted service disruptions, often for extended periods of time. The relative ease and low costs of launching such attacks, supplemented by the current woeful state of any viable defense mechanism, have made them one of the top threats to the Internet community today. While distributed packet logging and/or packet marking have been explored in the past for DDoS attack traceback/mitigation, we propose to advance the state of the art by using a novel distributed divide-and-conquer approach in designing a new data dissemination architecture that efficiently tracks attack sources. The main focus of our work is to tackle the three disjoint aspects of the problem, namely attack tree construction, attack path frequency detection, and packet to path association, independently and to use succinct recurrence relations to express their individual implementations. We also evaluate the network traffic and storage overhead induced by our proposed deployment on real-life Internet topologies, supporting hundreds of victims each subject to thousands of high-bandwidth flows simultaneously, and conclude that we can truly achieve single packet traceback guarantees with minimal overhead and high efficiency.