What we can learn from Google’s fight with phishing

Source: https://schd.ws/hosted_files/bsidessf2018/19/Bsides%20SF%202018%20-%20You%20want%20to%20step%20outside_%20What%20we%20can%20learn%20from%20Google%E2%80%99s%20fight%20with%20phishing%20-%20Neal%20Mueller.pdf

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Systematic Generation of Fast Elliptic Curve Cryptography Implementations

Widely used implementations of cryptographic primitives
employ number-theoretic optimizations specific to large
prime numbers used as moduli of arithmetic. These optimizations
have been applied manually by a handful of experts,
using informal rules of thumb. We present the first
automatic compiler that applies these optimizations, starting
from straightforward modular-arithmetic-based algorithms
and producing code around 5X faster than with off-the-shelf
arbitrary-precision integer libraries for C. Furthermore, our
compiler is implemented in the Coq proof assistant; it produces
not just C-level code but also proofs of functional
correctness. We evaluate the compiler on several key primitives
from elliptic curve cryptography

Source: https://people.csail.mit.edu/jgross/personal-website/papers/2018-fiat-crypto-pldi-draft.pdf

Beyond Corp 1 – A New Approach to Enterprise Security

Virtually every company today uses firewalls to enforce perimeter
security. However, this security model is problematic because, when
that perimeter is breached, an attacker has relatively easy access to a
company’s privileged intranet. As companies adopt mobile and cloud technologies,
the perimeter is becoming increasingly difficult to enforce. Google
is taking a different approach to network security. We are removing the
requirement for a privileged intranet and moving our corporate applications
to the Internet.

Source: https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/43231.pdf

Beyond Corp 2 – Design to Deployment

The goal of Google’s BeyondCorp initiative is to improve our security
with regard to how employees and devices access internal applications.
Unlike the conventional perimeter security model, BeyondCorp
doesn’t gate access to services and tools based on a user’s physical location
or the originating network; instead, access policies are based on information
about a device, its state, and its associated user. BeyondCorp considers both
internal networks and external networks to be completely untrusted, and
gates access to applications by dynamically asserting and enforcing levels, or
“tiers,” of access.
We present an overview of how Google transitioned from traditional security infrastructure
to the BeyondCorp model and the challenges we faced and the lessons we learned in the process.
For an architectural discussion of BeyondCorp, see [1].

Source: https://static.googleusercontent.com/media/research.google.com/en//pubs/archive/44860.pdf

Canary Analysis Service – ACM Queue

In 1913, Scottish physiologist John Scott Haldane proposed the idea of bringing a caged canary into a mine to detect dangerous gases. More than 100 years later, Haldane’s canary-in-the-coal-mine approach is also applied in software testing.

In this article, the term canarying refers to a partial and time-limited deployment of a change in a service, followed by an evaluation of whether the service change is safe. The production change process may then roll forward, roll back, alert a human, or do something else. Effective canarying involves many decisions—for example, how to deploy the partial service change or choose meaningful metrics—and deserves a separate discussion.

Google has deployed a shared centralized service called CAS (Canary Analysis Service) that offers automatic (and often autoconfigured) analysis of key metrics during a production change. CAS is used to analyze new versions of binaries, configuration changes, data-set changes, and other production changes. CAS evaluates hundreds of thousands of production changes every day at Google.

Source: https://queue.acm.org/detail.cfm?id=3194655